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Precedent in-East and West*
Ewoud Hondius**
I. Introduction
Throughout Europe, academics have been active over the past
decade in a half studying the desirability and feasibility of harmonizing
private law.' The question may be raised-and that is precisely the
question I wish to address here-whether or not even a fully harmonized
private law will be applied the same way all over Europe. I will argue
that this is not necessarily the case. In various legal systems, the law in
action and the law in the books may differ from one another to varying
degrees. Courts may interpret uniform law in line with national
traditions.2  One of these traditions has to do with precedent. The
English common law, as is well known, is based on cases, whereas civil
law systems are based on legislation. Furthermore, there are conflicting
theories on the importance of precedent.3 In this paper, I will explore to
what extent these different approaches are converging in a Uniting
Europe.4 In fact, there are actually three approaches. I will argue that in
civil law systems, two trends are discemable. In Western Europe,
precedent plays an important role in practice, even when this is not
always acknowledged in legal writing. In Central and Eastern Europe,
* Work in progress. I earlier wrote on this subject in the M Langes Marcel Fontaine
(Bruxelles, 2003) and I hope to expand my research in a general report to be submitted to
the Utrecht Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in 2006.
** Professor of Civil Law, University of Utrecht; Member, International Academy of
Commercial and Consumer Law.
1. See ARTHUR HARTKAMP ET AL., TOwARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, (The Hague:
Kluwer/Nijmegen: Ars Aequi, 3rd ed. 2004).
2. HARTMUT HAHN, NATIONALE AUSLEGUNGSMETHODEN, VERGLEICHEND
BETRACHTET-EUROPAISCHE ANFORDERUNGEN AN DIE METHODENLEHRE, ZEITSCHRIFT FUFR
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 163-170 (2003).
3. See URS PETER GRUBER, METHODEN DES INTERNATIONALEN EINHEITSRECHTS 2757
328 (Tiibingen: Mohr ed., 2004).
4. Mark Van Hoecke predicts that "The Europeanisation of private law will slowly,
but thoroughly, influence theory building in the various jurisdictions." See MARK VAN
HOECKE, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 398 (Oxford: Hart ed.,
2004).
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however, the practice is different. In the former socialist nations,
precedent was not only denied a place as source of law, but the courts
have often adhered to this doctrine-and perhaps still do-in fact. I will
argue that this is not desirable, even apart from the question of
harmonization. A possible fourth group of jurisdictions-those where
western law has been exported beyond its host jurisdictions and where in
the words of Patrick Glenn the problem of corruption has assumed
massive proportions 5-will be left out in this paper.
II. Structure of this Paper
In the common law, cases have always been the cornerstone of the
legal system. Stare decisis is an age-old tradition. In civil law systems
the courts are but the "bouche de la loi." Although in civil law
jurisdictions, case-law plays an increasing role in the process of
"Rechtsfortbildung," this is hard to reconcile with the classical division
of the trias politica, where it is the legislature's monopoly to lay down
rules.
The notion of the history of precedent alluded to in the aforementioned
words, I must admit, until recently was mine. This conception, however, is
false, as I shall try to explain in the first Part of this paper, first with regard
to the common law and then with regard to West European law and Central
and East European law. Regarding civil law, I will start by mentioning, by
way of example, a legal system well-known to myself, that of the
Netherlands, and more in particular its legal writing. I will then briefly
engage in an excursion into other civil law systems, before venturing into
the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Having surveyed the law as it
is, I will then in a second Part venture into a look into the future, first with
regard to the common law, then West European law and finally Central and
East European law. I will conclude this essay with a prognosis for the
future of precedent in Europe.
This paper is limited to private law, although some of the findings may
also be valid for criminal law and public law. For reasons of time and
space I have refrained from analysing the role of precedent in the practice
of the two main European courts, the European Court of Justice in
Luxemburg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.6
The subject of "precedent" may seem somewhat out of tune with the
general theme of this conference: "Globalization, regionalization and
5. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD/SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN
LAW 247 (Oxford: University Press ed., 2000).
6. There is reason to believe that at least the first mentioned court adheres to the
French legal method of dealing with cases. See STEFAN VOGENAUER, DIE AUSLEGUNG
VON GESETZEN IN ENGLAND UND AUF DEM KONTINENT 1481 (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck
2001).
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transplants in commercial and consumer law." However, I would submit
that it may throw light on issues which are discussed in other papers for this
conference, such as those on a CISG Digest,7 harmonization of product
liability case-law, and the ius commune casebooks.9
III. The Status Quo and Its Development
In this section I will try to describe some of the principal
developments relating to precedent.
A. Precedent in the Common Law
Earlier, in Section II, I mentioned the widespread belief-or at least
what I myself believed until recently-that precedent and common law
are interchangeable. This belief, as most lawyers from common law
background already know, happens to be erroneous. The system of
precedents is much younger than the common law itself, it is not
uncontested and it is subject to erosion. Historically speaking, precedent
is much younger than one might think. "Prior to the mid- or late
nineteenth century, judges in England did not regard themselves bound
by earlier decisions (... ).,,1 According to the thinking of the time of
Bracton in 1256, "the law was not to be found in individual cases; rather
the case decisions in their totality were a reflection of the law."" Among
other factors, the rise of the printed text and the establishment of a
hierarchy of courts combined in the sixteenth century to shift the nature
of legal reasoning to the common law.' 2  Other elements which
contributed to the rise of stare decisis were the growing custom of giving
reasons for decisions and the improvement in the quality of law
reporting.
7. Peter Winship, Digesting the CISG Case Law: Implications for Uniform
Interpretation, Paper for the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law
(Riga, Aug. 12-14, 2004).
8. Mads Andenas, Problems of Harmonizing European Private Law-Product
Liability as a Case, Paper for the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer
Law (Riga, Aug. 12-14, 2004).
9. Walter Van Gerven, Convergence, a New and Open Method of Approximation of
Private Law, Paper for the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law
(Riga, Aug. 12-14, 2004).
10. J. DAVID MURPHY, ROBERT RUETER, STARE DECISIS IN COMMONWEALTH
APPELLATE COuRTS 3 (Toronto: Butterworths 1981).
11. Thomas Lundmark, "Soft" Stare Decisis: The Common Law Doctrine Retooled
for Europe, in REINER SCHULZE, RICHTERRECHT UND RECHTSFORTBILDUNG IN DER
EUROPISCHEN RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 161-168 (Ulrike Seifed., Tilbingen: Mohr 2003).
12. David J. Ibbetson, Case-law and Doctrine: A Historical Perspective on the
English Common Law, in REINER SCHULZE, RiCHTERRECHT UND RECHTSFORTBILDUNG IN
DER EUROPAiSCHEN RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 27, 33 (Ulrike Seif ed., Tuibingen: Mohr
2003).
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Only in 1898 was the binding force of precedents accepted, 13 although
everyone was not completely convinced. For instance, Lord Denning,
known for his dissenting opinions, engaged in an epic battle with
precedents. 14 Before him, Lord Wright had already criticised the-now
relinquished-theory whereby the House of Lords was bound by its own
decisions.'5 Moreover, there has always been opposition in academic
circles:
Judges owe their fidelity, not to the pronouncements of predecessors,
but to the law. They might not now identify that as ancient custom,
and in practice they will usually discover it in the law reports, but
they are ultimately free to reject a precedent if they do not believe it
represents the law.
16
The prevailing view on precedent does give courts some discretionary
power: "most cases coming to appellate courts for decision allow judges
considerable scope for avoiding precedents which would result in
injustice or an otherwise inappropriate decision."' 7
We should keep in mind that the notion of "precedent" in the common
law stands for two different meanings:
In English law, the concept of "precedent" covers two ideas that are
closely connected. In the broad sense, precedent involves treating
previous judicial decisions as authoritative statements of the law
which can serve as good legal reasons for subsequent decisions. In
the narrow sense, precedent (often described as stare decisis) requires
judges in specific courts to treat certain previous decisions, notably of
superior courts, as a binding reason. 
8
The system of precedent has a number of exceptions; Holdsworth already
mentioned these in 1934.19 But, on the whole, the system of precedent
seems well established in common law countries, which in the European
13. London Tramways Co. v. London County Council, A C 375 (1898).
14. See M. ADAMS, TIJDscHRir VoORPRIVAATRECHT 13, 37-40 (2002).
15. Lord Wright, Precedents, Cambridge L.J. 122 (1944).
16. Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in
LAURENCE GOLDSTEIN, PRECEDENTINLA W 73, 87 (Oxford: Clarendon 1987). See also A.L.
Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, LAW QUARTERLY REvIEw 40-65
(1934).
17. CATRIONA COOK ET AL., LAYING DOWN THE LAW 79 (London: Butterworth, 5th ed.
2001). The authors refer to a decision of the Australian High Court in which
notwithstanding a two hundred year old precedent rape within marriage was held possible.
Id. at 107. In addition, the authors discuss the court's rejection of vicarious liability in
Rylands v. Fletcher. Id. at 109.
18. John Bell, Sources of Law, in PETER BIRKs, ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW 1, 29 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2000).
19. RUPERT CROSS AND J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 125 (Oxford:
Clarendon, 4"hed. 1991) (quoting 50 LAW QUARTERLY REvIEw 180 (1934)).
[Vol. 23:3
PRECEDENT IN EAST AND WEST
Union include Cyprus, England, Ireland, Malta and Scotland, the latter
being a mixed legal system.
B. Precedent in a Civil Law Jurisdiction: The Netherlands
From a historical perspective, the era of ius commune was one in
which there was a system of precedents on the European continent, as has
been set out by Jan Drion in his inaugural address at Leyden University.20
With the entry of the codification principle on the continent, the system of
precedents was all but abolished. In fact, the Prussian Code of 1794 held
that "auf altere Ausspriiche der Richter bei kiinftigen Entscheidungen keine
Riicksicht genommen werden (soll)' (in future cases, old decisions shall
not be taken into consideration).2 ' In France, as well as other countries with
a system of cassation, courts only had to take into account another court's
decision after a renvoi by the Court of cassation.22 Precedents were
something of the past, at least in theory. In practice, case-law always
remained of interest, especially after well-known academics started to write
annotations.23
How does one reconcile this practice with the theory of the trias
politica? In his Ph.D. thesis, defended at the Erasmus University
24Rotterdam, Kottenhagen seeks to find a solution for the dilemma. He
arrives at the conclusion that a Dutch judge is bound to follow precedents
"unless he can show why this precedent is wrong, outmoded, unjust or
distinguishable. 25  In the footsteps of Vranken,26 Haazen argues that
precedents should be "sort of binding," which should be sufficient to speak
of a binding effect, while at the same time providing sufficient flexibility to
allow the courts to deviate.27  Rijpkema has argued that even if the
legislature is democratically controlled, it hardly makes legislation more
democratic than judge-made law.28 Woltjer has also analyzed the dilemma
in terms of the trias politica.29 There appears to be a communis opinio that
20. J. Drion, Stare decisis/Het gezag van precedenten, in VERZAMELDE GESCHRIFTEN
VAN J. DRION 142-170 (Deventer: Kluwer 1968).
21. Id. at 152.
22. Id. at 147 (this is in fact slightly more nuanced).
23. In the Netherlands Eduard Maurits Meijers and Paul Scholten, who both became
annotators for the Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, were of major importance in this regard.
24. R.J.P. KOTTENHAGEN, VAN PRECEDENT TOT PRECEDENT 389 (Arnhem: Gouda
Quint 1986).
25. Id. at 312.
26. J.B.M. VRANKEN, C. ASSER'S HANDLEIDING TOT DE BEOEFENING VAN HET
NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT/ALGEMEEN DEEL ** 190 (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk
Willink, 1995).
27. O.A. HAAZEN, ALGEMEEN DEEL VAN HET RECHTERLIJK OVERGANGSRECHT 340
(Tilburg 2001).
28. PETER RIJPKEMA, RECHTERSRECHT 232 (Den Haag: Boom 2001).
29. A.J.T. WOLTJER, WETGEVER, RECHTER EN HET PRIMAAT VAN DE GELIJKHEID 527
2005]
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in Dutch law there is a light variant of precedent. 30 As to the theoretical
foundation of this system, the opinions are divided.3'
C. Precedent in Other Civil Law Jurisdictions
Are the developments in the Netherlands an example of what is
happening in other civil law systems? Not completely, but the differences
are only marginal. In Belgium, when it looks as if the Cour de cassation is
unaware of any precedents, in fact it is the conclusions of the Parquet
g~n~ral and the mercuriales of the procureur-gbn~ral which serve as a
functional equivalent.32 In France, a strict division between law and fact
still has the consequence that courts of appeal are not considered to provide
precedents. In Germany, legal authors sometimes argue that once the
Bundesgerichtshof has overturned previous caselaw, this will apply
retroactively to the date of the entry into force of the legislation concerned
to all cases arisen prior to the decision.33 As for the theory behind this,
authors are divided between Fikentscher's "Theorie der Fallnorm ''34 and
Bydlinski's "Lehre von der subsididren Verbindlichkeit des
Prijudizienrechts. ' 35 For a more extended analysis, I refer to the study by
MacCormick and Summers36 and to a volume edited by Vincenti.
37
According to many authors, a convergence is taking place: "common law
and civil law practice, each in like fashion to the other, likewise admit of
justified departures from precedent., 38 This convergence also is apparent
from a number of recent publications on the legitimacy of the judge.39
(Den Haag: Boom).
30. I. Giesen, De 'achterblijvers' van de rechtsontwikkeling: over verouderde
rechtspraak en hoe er weer vanaf te komen, WPNR Nr 6494 (2002) (appears to defend
the contrary). But see WPNR Nr. 6507 (2002) (Giesen's Post Scriptum, under my
reaction, of which this paper is a further elaboration).
31. There is an abundance of philosophical writing on this theme. See RAIMO
SITTALA, A THEORY OF PRECEDENT/FROM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM TO A POST-
ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Oxford: Hart 2000).
32. Isabelle Rorive, Le revirement de jurisprudence/Etude de droit anglais et de droit
beige 504, 520 (Bruxelles: Bruylant 2003).
33. See ANDREAS HELDRICH, 50 JAHRE RECXHTSPRECHUNG DES BGH-AUF DEM
WEG ZU EINEM PRAJUDIZIENRECHT?/FESTVORTRAG zUM 50-JAHRIGEN BESTEHEN DES BGH
497-500 (2000).
34. W. Fikentscher, Prajudizienbindung, Zeitschrift ffir Rechtsvergleichung 518
(1985).
35. FRANZ BYDLINSKI, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE tJND RECHTSBEGRIFF 501-515
(Wien: Springer, 2d ed. 1991).
36. D. NEIL MACCORMICK, ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS
(Dartmouth: Ashgate 1997).
37. UMBERTO VINCENTI, IL VALORE DEI PRECEDENTI GIUDIZIALI NELLA TRADIZIONE
EUROPEA (PADOVA: CEDAM 1998).
38. MacCormick and Summers, supra note 36, at 531, 535.
39. In 2002, this was one of the subjects on the agenda of the Sixteenth Comparative
Congress of the Acadbmie Internationale de Droit Compare. See, e.g., The national
[Vol. 23:3
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D. Precedent in Central and Eastern Europe
So far, this paper has presented the place of precedent in common and
civil law as one evolving from two conflicting trends: the common law
trend towards precedent, although recently showing a slight recoil, and the
civil law trend away from precedent, with a slightly earlier a tendency
towards recognition of precedent. Where does this leave the legal systems
of Central and Eastern Europe? The answer can be short: they are back
where the civil law countries stood some fifty years ago: "the post-
communist judicial methodology is much closer to the narratives of the
European legal culture that prevailed in the nineteenth century. 'Ao One of
the reasons for this can be found in the writings of communist writers. In
the former Czechoslovakia, the role of precedent was denied on the ground
that as a source of socialist law, it would go against the principle of
democratic centralism. 41 In this view, judge-made law is incomprehensible,
beyond the reach of the vast masses of population. Likewise, the
Hungarian Edrsi emphasised that the socialist legal system consisted
exclusively of written law.42  The situations in the German Democratic
Republic 43 and Estonia 4 were very similar. A problem also was the
paucity of reported cases. One author, writing about Russian tort law, had
to resort to newspaper clippings to find out about lawsuits against the
government.45 Only in Poland, the writing of Wr6blewski may have been
influential in the use of precedent.46
Kuhn suggests that the type of cases decided by courts in Central and
Eastern Europe, often very simple, was much different from that in Western
Europe:
reports of J.L.M. Gribnau, Legitimacy of the Judiciary, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE
SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 25-45 (Antwerpen:
Intersentia 2002); BARTHELEMY MERCADAL, LA LEGITIMITE DU JUGE, REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 277-291 (2002); ANDREAS VOBKUHLE, GERNOT
SYDOW, DIE DEMOKRATISCHE LEGITIMATION DES RICHTERS, JURISTEN ZEITUNG 673-682
(2002).
40. ZDENEK KUHN, WORLDS APART/WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDICIAL
CULTURE AT THE ONSET OF THE EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT (2004).
41. Id. (quoting BOGUSZAK, ZAKLADY SOCIALISTICKE ZAKONNOSTI V CSSR 144
(Praha 1963).
42. G. EORSI, COMPARATIVE CIVIL (PRIVATE) LAw/LAW TYPES, LAW GROUPS, THE
ROADS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 547 (Budapest 1979).
43. Inga Markovits, Children of a Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist
Germany, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2270 (1996).
44. F. Emmert, The Independence of Judges: A Concept Often Misunderstood in
Central and Eastern Europe, 9 EUR. J. OF L. REF. 405 (2002).
45. Donald D. Barry, Tort law and the State in Russia, in GEORGE GINSBURGS ET. AL,
THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE/ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE 179, 187 (The Hague: Nijhoff 1996).
46. Jerzy Wr6blewski, The Judicial Application of Law (Kluwer 1992).
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Complex issues of international litigation, or of administrative,
constitutional or commercial law, either did not arise in the socialist
state or the task of resolving them was transferred from courts to
other bodies. For instance, East German judges handled a caseload
consisting 51% of family law issues, while the caseloads of their
West German counterparts contained only 13.7% of similar cases.
47
Kiihn further observes the status of the judiciary:
It was impoverished, lacking in prestige, with very problematic
education, ignored by the elites, who generally did not join the
judiciary, either before or after the anti-communist revolution. The
judiciary continued to be a predominantly female profession, which
was, however, not the sign of flourishing gender equality.
48
According to this author, since the fall of communism the old philosophy of
bound decision-making continues:
The ordinary courts in the Czech and Slovak republics, and most
other post-communist nations, have never acted as one might expect
transitional courts would act. With the exception of the constitutional
courts, the post-communist courts have continued their formalist
reading of the law. When it was necessary to solve a more difficult
case, they often saved themselves by disposing of the case on purely
formalist grounds.
49
Kiihn informs us about his own experience in the Czech Republic:
It is not rare to find a judge, especially in the lower courts in both the
Slovak and Czech Republics, who refuse during trial even any
reference to precedent or legal science because she is not "bound by
them" and, therefore, they are without any importance for her
reasoning, which remains independent of anything but the letter of
the law.
5
Not all experiences are negative. Peter Solomon informs us about the
admirable performance of administrative courts in post-Soviet Russia,
notwithstanding a dramatic growth of jurisdiction and of caseload. 5'
IV. The Future
What does the future hold in stock for us? Are the common law and
47. ZDENEK KUHN, WORLDS APART/WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDICIAL




51. Peter H. Solomon Jr., Judicial Power in Russia: Through the Prism of
Administrative Justice, 38 L. & Soc. REV. 549-581 (2004).
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the civil law converging and is it simply a question of time before Central
and Eastern Europe's backlog is overcome? In the following sections of
this paper, I will answer these questions.
A. Common Law: The Future
It seems as if the very strict adherence to stare decisis has slightly
declined over the past half century. Recently, there seems to be more room
for divergence. On the basis of a number of cases which attracted much
popular attention, Harris has concluded that precedents should be easier to
depart from:
The presumption to date has been that stare decisis values should
prevail over the overruling of "merely wrong" precedents. I think
that the presumption should be reversed in favour of the overruling of
wrong precedents unless their retention can be justified in the
circumstances by overriding stare decisis values.
52
B. Western Europe: Towards Convergence with the Common Law?
Many writers in civil law countries seem to be of the opinion that the
future lies with a system in which precedent plays a larger role, as
compared with legislation. Adams, for example, argues for a culture of
attributing binding effect to judicial precedents. 3 I do not share this view.
It seems to me that the notion of the primacy of precedents of one single
Supreme Court in a legal system no longer is adequate. There are two
arguments which I can give. First, the central position of courts-and the
rather humble role of legal writing-is changing. In most European
countries, Constitutional courts or councils have gained importance. If one
reads recent overviews of Belgian or German case-law, the importance of
the decisions of the Arbitration Court (Belgium's Constitutional Court) and
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany's Constitutional Court) is
overwhelming. But the Belgian Cour de cassation and the German
Bundesgerichtshof will also have to follow the decisions of the two
European courts: the Luxembourg Court of Justice-including its Court of
first instance--of the European Union and the Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg. The Marx case is an example of a European decision of the
52. B.V. Harris, Final Appellate Courts Overruling their Own "Wrong" Precedents:
The Ongoing Search for Principle, 18 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 408, 427 (2002). The
author develops a number of "considerations relevant to deciding whether to defer to or
overrule precedent." Id. at 422.
53. MAURICE ADAMs, STARE DECISIS ET QUIETA NON MOVERE/RECHTSZEKERHEID EN
DE GEBONDENHEID AAN PRECEDENTEN IN HET ENGELSE RECHTSSYSTEEM. LESSEN VOOR
ONS? 13, 50 (2002).
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latter court which has exerted considerable influence in Belgium. In the
future, a system of federal European courts under the two Luxemburg
courts is also imaginable.
Apart from this formal argument, there also is a substantive argument.
The changes in norms and values, in theories as to finding the law,
nowadays are so rapid, that case-law-which often takes a long time to be
submitted to a legal system's highest court-simply cannot cope with them.
Legal writers will have to fill the gap. They should formulate general
principles and fit in the various bodies of case-law developed by the
traditional highest civil courts, the newly formed constitutional courts and
the European courts. Attributing stare decisis to the decisions of one of
these courts no longer fits into this system. This will mean that established
precedents, which have not yet been challenged in the courts, may well lose
their value, because they are at variance with the newly developed general
principles, such as that of non-discrimination,54  equality,55  or
proportionality.
So far, I have addressed purely national questions of precedent. In
Europe, however, there is a growing body of community law. It does not
make sense that this law is being interpreted in different ways and by way
of different systems of reasoning in the various jurisdictions. In this regard,
civil law jurisdictions have much to learn from common law courts, where
the use of precedents from other common law jurisdiction, if only as
persuasive precedents, is by no means exceptional.56 Recently, English
courts have even accepted continental cases as-persuasive-precedents.
57
Civil law courts rarely take into account what is happening over the border.
I would suggest that the blame does not lie exclusively with the courts.
Legal academics have a task in preparing the use of comparative law. A
most important part of this is the collection of cases, assembling these into a
database and providing translations into easily accessible languages.58
54. See, e.g., NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH
OF ACCOUNTABILITY 309 (Antwerpen: Intersentia 2002).
55. DENIS BERTHIAU, LE PRINCIPE D'EGALITt ET LE DROIT CIVIL DES CONTRATS 475
(Paris: LGDJ 1999).
56. A famous example is the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, AC 562, All ER 1 (HL)
(1932), where a New Jersey case was used.
57. See cases such as White v. Jones, 2 AC 207, 2 WLR 187(1995); Fairchild v
Glenhaven Funeral Services, 3 WLR 89 (2002); and BASIL MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE
LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND CLASSROOM/THE STORY OF THE LAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS
273 (Oxford: Hart 2003) (quoting Greatorex v. Greatorex, 1 WLR 1970 (2000)).
58. Some examples are the several collections of cases relating to the Vienna Sales
Convention and the one on the EU directive on product liability, set out by Thomas
Lundmark, "Soft" Stare Decisis: The Common Law Doctrine Retooled for Europe, in
REINER SCHULZE, ULRIKE SELF, RICHTERRECHT UND RECHTSFORTBILDUNG IN DER
EUROPAISCHEN RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 161, 168 (Tiibingen: Mohr 2003).
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C. Central and Eastern Europe: We Shall Overcome
Should the status of precedent in Central and Eastern Europe continue
in its present form? In order for their legal systems to react quickly to new
developments, it is essential that they follow their Western civil law
counterparts. How should this be accomplished? I will not try to give an
exhaustive answer to this question, but will simply come up with some
suggestions.
First, legal doctrine is important in this matter. It is essential that the
importance of case law is stressed in national books on legal methodology.
Second, cases should be reported far more often than what is presently
done. Until recently, the number of law reviews or other publications
devoted to reporting of cases has been very limited. Additionally, it was
often viewed that reporting a case gives it more weight. Therefore, such
cases must be carefully selected, preferably by justices in the Supreme
Court. Since the process of selection takes a considerable time, cases are
reported with considerable delay.59 I do not suggest that this selection
process be abolished, but rather that it shall be supplemented by law reports
for specific areas that are based on voluntary submissions by judges and
attorneys. The argument that this will cost very much, in this era of
electronic law reports is no longer valid.
Third, in order for the reported cases to have any impact, they should
be annotated. This is the lesson to be learned from Western Europe. The
annotations of the two grandmasters of Dutch civil law, Meijers and
Scholten, revolutionised the place of case law in the Netherlands. In
France, it is still virtually impossible for an outsider to fathom the relevance
of a case handed down by the Cour de cassation without case notes. This is
easier said than done. At first, courts may not like others criticising their
opinions and this may reflect upon the annotators. This in turn may shy
away possible annotators who do not wish to jeopardise their career.
Fourth, legal education should take into consideration the importance
of case-law as authoritative. The impression one gets from legal education
in Central and Eastern Europe is that precedent is not taught at all.
Exchange students, upon arrival in Western Europe, in their classroom
papers do not report cases, unless by way of example. The place of case-
law in the legal education of Slovakia becomes clear from the following
quotation:
During my early studies at a faculty of law in Slovakia, I do not
remember reading a single court decision. Case law had always been
considered as source of law only in the common law system, and not
59. EMILIA CAPRNDOVA, IMPORTANCE OF CASE LAW/COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
ENGLISH, GERMAN AND SLOVAK LAW 44 (Utrecht 2004).
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ours, although it was admitted, that decisions of the Slovak Supreme
Court are de facto been followed. This phrase de facto, but not de
iure was repeated many times, without actual introducing any court
decision or pointing out its real importance in our legal order.
Rather, it was stressed, that Slovak law is not based on court
decisions; they are binding only for specific parties, not generally.
They are definitely not sources of our law. As the role of case law
had considerably been neglected, and this was presented as the reality
in all civil law countries, I got the impression, that whole continental
Europe does not use them at all.
60
And to quote yet Kiihn again:
Legal academia supports the old dogmas of the inferior role of the
judiciary and of parliamentary sovereignty. During the first ten years
of the Czech Constitutional Court's existence (1993-2003) the
prevailing attitude of the educators at the Czech law schools was
oriented strongly against the Constitutional Court. The
Constitutional Court is often considered a symbol of poor reasoning,
as it openly employs value reasoning instead of textual arguments.
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Fifth, if we wait for the current generation of law students to move
into key positions in society, it will take another twenty to thirty years
before Central and Eastern European countries have caught up. We should
therefore also provide continuing legal education to the present holders of
key positions.
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D. The Future of Precedent
What may we learn from the developments sketched above? There
seem to be conflicting tendencies in civil and common law. On the
European continent, there was a system of precedents before the
codification in the nineteenth century. Because of the primacy, which at the
turn of the eighteenth century was attributed to legislation, precedent lost its
importance. But, because of idleness of the legislature in the area of private
law, the courts gradually regained some of their former positions. In this,
the courts were helped by legal writing, which in its annotations provided
case-law with terms of reference and allowed practitioners to see its
importance. Legal theory comes to the conclusion that there is once again a
light version of the system of precedent, although with exceptions and ways
60. Id. at 4.
61. ZDENEK KOHN, WORLDS APART/WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDICIAL
CULTURE AT THE ONSET OF THE EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT (2004).
62. I am myself involved in a MATRA project supported by the European Union,
which aims at helping Czech judges to cope with case law. The project includes funding
of a law report, Jurisprudence.
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Not all civil law systems are in the same state of development.
Especially lagging behind are the systems of Central and Eastern Europe,
which still suffer from their socialist past. In the common law systems, the
development has been the reverse. Until the nineteenth century, there was
no system of precedent. Only recently has it been accepted that the courts
should also follow "wrong" precedent. In this sense, there is a major
difference with the civil law, where courts are not bound to follow wrong
precedent.63 The difference, however, is diminishing-witness the recent
call in the common law by B.V. Harris for reversal of the main rule.6 4
Most authors predict that the future lies in the common law, which
will gradually extend its theory of precedent first to Western and then to
Central and Eastern Europe. I do not share this view, but I do agree that
equality and predictability justify adherence to at least a limited theory of
stare decisis.65 I also agree that legal theory should take into account that
the law does not evolve within itself I do, however, oppose the
introduction in civil law jurisdictions to a strict system of precedent as may
still be found in common law systems. Instead, I advocate a system based
on persuasive authority of cases as contextualised by legal doctrine.
63. That continental courts, unlike their common law counterparts, do not consider
themselves bound by "wrong cases" is apparent from cases such as Hoge Raad 7 March
1980, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1980, 353, in which the Dutch Supreme Court
accepted that its view had for a long time not been observed by lower courts.
64. B.V. Harris, Final Appellate Courts Overruling their Own "Wrong Precedents:"
The Ongoing Search for Principle, 118 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEw 408, 427 (2002).
65. Thomas Lundmark, "Soft" Stare Decisis: The Common Law Doctrine Retooled
for Europe, in REINER SCHULZE, ULRIKE SEF, RICHTERRECHT UND RECHTSFORTBILDUNG
IN DER EUROPAISCHEN RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 166 (Tibingen: Mohr 2003).
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